

ORIGINAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

FILED  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
AUGUSTA DIV.

2008 FEB 20 AM 11:18

CLERK L. J. [Signature]  
SO. DIST. OF GA.

RICKEY A. THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CV 107-141

RONNIE STRENGTH, Sheriff of  
Richmond County, in his official capacity,  
et al.,

Defendants.

---

**MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

---

Plaintiff, who was an inmate detained at the Charles B. Webster Detention Center located in Augusta, Georgia when this action commenced, filed the above-captioned civil rights case *pro se* and requested permission to proceed *in forma pauperis* ("IFP"). On November 6, 2007, the Court directed Plaintiff to return his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement and Consent to Collection of Fees forms within thirty (30) days and advised Plaintiff that all prisoners, even those proceeding IFP, must pay the filing fee of \$350.00 in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to respond would be an election to have this case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. no. 3, p. 4). Plaintiff failed to respond.

On December 14, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff ten (10) additional days to comply with the terms of the Court's November 6, 2007 Order. (Doc. no. 4). Once again, Plaintiff

was warned that his failure to comply in a timely fashion with the Court's Order would result in a recommendation that his case be dismissed. (*Id.* at 2). The time to respond has passed, and Plaintiff has not submitted the documents required by the Court's November 6, 2007 Order, nor has he provided the Court with any explanation why he has not complied. Plaintiff cannot proceed IFP unless he submits the requisite Trust Fund Account Statement and consents to the collection of the entire \$350.00 filing fee in installments. Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315, 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) (*per curiam*) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915).

Moreover, Plaintiff's service copy of the Court's December 14, 2007 Order was returned as "Undeliverable." Thus, in addition to failing to return the necessary IFP papers, Plaintiff has failed to notify the Court of a change of address. Plaintiff was warned that, if he failed to immediately inform the Court of any change of address while this action is pending, the Court would recommend dismissal of this case. (Doc. no. 3, p. 4). Plaintiff's failure to provide the Court with an address where he can be reached not only violates the Court's previous Order, but it also has the effect of saddling the Court with a stagnant case.

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that "the district court's power to control its docket includes the inherent power to dismiss a case . . . ." Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1983); *see also* Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) ("It is also clear that a district court's power to control its docket includes the inherent power to dismiss a case."); Hylar v. Reynolds Metal Co., 434 F.2d 1064, 1065 (5th Cir. 1970) ("It is well settled that a

district court has inherent power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute . . .”). Moreover, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia dictate that an “assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, *sua sponte* . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice . . . [for] failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.” Loc. R. 41.1(c).

The test for determining the appropriateness of dismissal is whether there is “a clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). Here, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with multiple Court Orders, or even to provide the Court with a valid address, amounts not only to a failure to prosecute, but also an abandonment of his case. This is precisely the type of neglect contemplated by the Local Rules. Furthermore, because Plaintiff is conditionally proceeding *in forma pauperis*, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary sanctions is not a feasible sanction.

As Plaintiff has neither fulfilled the requirements for proceeding IFP, nor paid the filing fee, nor notified the Court of a change of address, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** that this case be **DISMISSED**, without prejudice.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of February, 2008, at Augusta, Georgia.

  
W. LEON BARFIELD  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE